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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania tried Ian Tapper for robbery twice.  The first 
jury acquitted Tapper of aggravated assault and possession of an instrument of crime.  
The same jury hung on the robbery charge.  The second jury convicted Tapper of 
robbery.  Tapper sought habeas relief, contending that the second trial was a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy, as articulated in Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).  The District Court disagreed and denied Tapper’s habeas 
petition.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.   
I. Background 
A. Factual Background 
On August 26, 2006, after two drinks at a bar in North Philadelphia, Edward 
Roberts and his friend, Jeffrey Branson, drove to a restaurant in West Philadelphia.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Branson parked his vehicle and remained in it while Roberts went inside for food.  
Roberts waited about ten minutes for his food and then exited the restaurant.   
As Roberts walked back to Branson’s vehicle, Tapper approached Roberts from 
behind and asked, “where’s the money?”  JA113.  Roberts thought Tapper was joking, 
and he kept walking.  Roberts outweighed Tapper by almost one hundred pounds and was 
several inches taller than Tapper.   
Tapper approached Roberts from behind again and grabbed him by the shirt.  At 
this point, Roberts realized that Tapper was not joking, and Roberts began to punch 
Tapper.  Roberts saw that it was Tapper who was accosting him.  Roberts and Tapper fell 
to the ground as they tussled.  Roberts never saw Tapper holding a gun, but he did hear 
shots.  Roberts was shot in his chest, wrist, and thigh.   
Roberts picked himself up off the ground and returned to Branson’s vehicle.  
Branson sped down the street and nearly collided with a police car two blocks away from 
the restaurant.  Officer Michael Carey, the driver of the police car, had been about a 
block away from the corner store and heard the gunshots.  Officer Carey stopped the car 
and had Branson exit.  Officer Carey questioned Branson, who explained that Roberts 
had been shot in front of the restaurant.  Officer Carey also questioned Roberts, who 
provided a description of the shooter, but did not identify Tapper as the shooter.  Officer 
Carey saw that Roberts was shot in the chest and allowed Branson to rush Roberts to the 
hospital.   
Branson took Roberts to the Hospital of University of Pennsylvania, where 
Roberts underwent surgery for his wounds.  Branson was then transported to the 
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Southwest Detectives Division, where he was interviewed.  Branson was killed in a 
homicide before Tapper’s first trial.   
Two days after Roberts was shot, Karl Rone gave a statement to Detective 
Timothy McCool.  Rone claimed that he was Roberts’s neighbor and that he had spoken 
to Roberts six hours after the shooting.  Rone also stated that Roberts told him Tapper 
was the shooter.  Rone told Detective McCool that Tapper was “hot-tempered and 
carrie[d] a gun.”  JA151.  Detective McCool inquired about the gun, and Rone stated that 
he thought Tapper carried a 9-millimeter gun and that the night before he had seen 
Tapper with the black butt of a gun in his waistband.  Rone was killed in a homicide prior 
to Tapper’s first trial.   
Three days after the shooting, Roberts identified Tapper as the shooter in a photo 
array, circled Tapper’s photograph, and signed it.  Tapper was subsequently arrested.   
B. Procedural Background 
Tapper’s first trial began on December 13, 2007.  Tapper was charged with 
attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime 
(“PIC”).  Prior to closing arguments, Tapper’s counsel moved for dismissal of the 
attempted murder charge, arguing that there was no specific intent to kill based on the 
evidence presented.  The trial court dismissed the attempted murder charge without 
explanation.   
Shortly after beginning its deliberations, the jury requested a “clarification o[f] the 
law.”  JA079.  The trial court provided a clarification and the jury continued its 
deliberations.  Shortly thereafter, the jury delivered its verdict, finding Tapper not guilty 
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on the aggravated assault and PIC charges.  The jury hung on the robbery charge.  After 
the jury was dismissed, the Commonwealth announced that they would retry Tapper.   
On August 20, 2009, Tapper was retried for robbery.  The jury returned a verdict 
of guilty on the same day it began its deliberations.  Tapper was sentenced to nine to 
twenty years’ imprisonment.   
Tapper pursued a direct appeal of his conviction.  That appeal was unsuccessful, 
with the trial court affirming the denial of Tapper’s motion to dismiss1 and the 
conviction.   
Tapper then appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.  The 
Superior Court rejected Tapper’s double jeopardy argument, finding that his 
interpretation of the result of his first trial was “over simplistic.”  The Superior Court did 
not analyze the evidence and arguments presented during the trials.  Instead, the Superior 
Court focused on the differences between the elements of robbery and aggravated assault.  
The Superior Court concluded, “a sole finding that [Tapper] did not have or use a gun is 
not dispositive of whether robbery was established at the second trial.”  JA418.     
On June 30, 2015, Tapper filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court referred 
Tapper’s petition to Magistrate Judge Marilyn Heffley for a Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”).  Judge Heffley issued two R&Rs recommending that the District Court deny 
Tapper’s petition.   
 
1 Prior to his second trial, Tapper moved to dismiss the robbery charge on double 
jeopardy grounds.  On November 18, 2008, the trial court denied Tapper’s motion.   
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On August 3, 2018, over Tapper’s objections, the District Court approved and 
adopted Judge Heffley’s second R&R.  The District Court did not issue a certificate of 
appealability.   
Tapper filed a timely notice of appeal and sought a certificate of appealability.  On 
June 20, 2019, this Court granted Tapper a certificate of appealability.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 
 Because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, our review of 
the District Court’s legal conclusions is plenary, and “we evaluate ‘the state court[’s] 
determinations under the same standard that the District Court was required to apply [as 
outlined below].’”  Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lewis v. 
Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009)).   
 Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), when a habeas petitioner’s claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state 
court, a federal court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court 
proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law,” or “resulted in a decision that was based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  “AEDPA erects ‘“a substantially higher 
threshold” for obtaining relief than de novo review.’”  Beard, 637 F.3d at 204 (citation 
omitted).   
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The District Court determined that the Pennsylvania Superior Court incorrectly 
applied federal law, but that its decision was not an unreasonable application of federal 
law because the same outcome was justified under a proper Ashe analysis.  Our plenary 
review focuses on that legal conclusion.  
“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect 
application of federal law.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (emphasis in 
original).  “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 
clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must 
also be unreasonable.”  Id. at 411.  Relief may only be granted if “the state court decision, 
evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be 
justified under existing Supreme Court precedent.”  Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197 
(3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 
877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
III. Discussion 
Tapper argues that his second trial violated the rule of collateral estoppel as 
embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy.  Tapper’s 
argument proceeds in two parts.   
First, Tapper contends that the first jury’s not guilty verdicts reflected the jury’s 
determination that Tapper “either did not possess a gun at all, or at least did not intend to 
use it to commit a crime, and that he, in fact did not use it against . . . Roberts or to 
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commit a crime.”  Appellant’s Br. 29.  In other words, Tapper argues that the first jury 
decided that he did not shoot Roberts.  Id.   
Second, Tapper argues that the Commonwealth impermissibly “relitigated the 
issue of whether . . . Tapper shot . . . Roberts.”  Id. at 31.  Specifically, Tapper contends 
that the Commonwealth’s “sole theory [during the second trial] was that . . . Tapper 
shot . . . Roberts while trying to steal from him,” and that the only evidence the 
Commonwealth presented was that Tapper harmed Roberts by shooting him.  Id. at 30.   
We agree with Tapper on the first point and do not agree on the second point.      
A. The Legal Framework 
Tapper bears the burden of “‘demonstrat[ing] that the issue whose relitigation he 
seeks to foreclose was actually decided’ by a prior jury’s verdict of acquittal.”  Bravo-
Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 359 (2016) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 
U.S. 222, 233 (1994)).  Under Ashe, collateral estoppel only bars the second trial “if to 
secure a conviction the prosecution must prevail on an issue the jury necessarily resolved 
in the defendant’s favor in the first trial.”  Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 
(2018); Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446 (finding that once the first jury “had determined upon 
conflicting testimony that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was one 
of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different identification evidence in 
a second prosecution for the [same] robbery . . . in the hope that a different jury might 
find that evidence more convincing.”).  “To say that the second trial is tantamount to a 
trial of the same offense as the first and thus forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
[the court] must be able to say that ‘it would have been irrational for the jury’ in the first 
9 
 
trial to acquit without finding in the defendant’s favor on a fact essential to a conviction 
in the second.”  Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2150 (emphasis in original) (quoting Yeager v. 
United States, 557 U.S. 110, 127 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment)).  
“[S]o long as a reasonable jury ‘could have’ based its decision on facts that would 
not create a double jeopardy violation, the subsequent prosecution may move forward.”  
Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444).  “[W]here no clear answer emerges, the tie goes to the 
Government . . . .”  Id.  The defendant bears a “heavy burden,” but “the government 
cannot avoid the preclusive effect of a general jury verdict by speculating that the verdict 
could have been based upon a finding that the government failed to prove elements that 
were never contested by the defense.”  United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 217–18 (3d 
Cir. 2010).   
 The rule of collateral estoppel is “not to be applied with the hypertechnical and 
archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.”  
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.  We “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into 
account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether 
a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the 
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “The inquiry 
‘must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the 
proceedings.’”  Id. (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)).   
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Within this framework, the Court must consider (1) what issue, if any, the first 
jury necessarily decided in Tapper’s favor, and (2) whether the Commonwealth was 
required to prevail on that issue during Tapper’s second trial to secure a conviction.  
Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2150. 
B. Tapper’s First Trial  
We agree with Tapper that the first jury necessarily decided that he was not the 
shooter based on three factors: the Commonwealth’s framing of the case and the evidence 
proffered; Tapper’s counsel’s theories of the case; and the trial court’s answers to 
questions from the jury.   
The Commonwealth opened the trial by describing it as “a case of robbery turned 
to gun violence” and “a case of senseless violence where this defendant, Ian Tapper, shot 
another young man multiple times in the chest, in the wrist, in the leg.”  JA108.  Nearly 
all of the testimony the Commonwealth elicited and the physical evidence it introduced 
was focused on the issue of whether Tapper was the shooter.  For example, the 
Commonwealth secured testimony that Roberts saw and identified Tapper seconds before 
he was shot and introduced ballistics evidence to establish that Roberts was shot with a 
9mm handgun.  The Commonwealth also introduced a statement by Karl Rone that 
Tapper had access to a 9-millimeter handgun.  In closing, the Commonwealth reiterated 
that “this case was a robbery turned to gun violence.  One man shooting another young 
man multiple times in the chest and in the leg, and all of the evidence that you’ve heard, 
and believe me, it’s there beyond a reasonable doubt, is that this defendant was the 
shooter.”  JA167.   
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Throughout the first trial, Tapper’s counsel attempted to develop two theories that 
focused on the issue of whether Tapper was the shooter.  First, defense counsel attempted 
to undermine Roberts’s testimony that there was no one else present outside of the 
restaurant at the time he was shot.  Second, Tapper’s counsel attempted to develop the 
theory that the police failed to collect Roberts’s clothing and never tested it to see if 
Roberts was shot from close range.  These two themes came together during defense 
counsel’s closing argument, when he argued that someone else other than Tapper could 
have shot Roberts as a way of coming to Tapper’s defense when the larger Roberts began 
striking Tapper.   
 The trial court’s response to the jury’s questions2 further confirms that the jury 
decided that Tapper was not the shooter.  The trial court stated:  
[T]here’s no question of fact that [Roberts] did, in fact, suffer 
serious bodily injury as that is defined in the law. . . .  [T]he 
remaining questions as to each the robbery and the aggravated 
assault is did the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, cause 
that injury in the course of committing an aggravated assault 
and in the course of committing a robbery. 
 
To find the accused guilty of aggravated assault the following 
elements have to be proven:  First, that the defendant caused 
serious bodily injury.  Half of that – I’ve instructed you already 
– serious bodily injury was, in fact, caused.  The question 
remains, as to that element, did the defendant cause the serious 
bodily injury.  
 
Second, if he did cause the serious bodily injury, was he acting 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life? 
 
2 The jury asked:  “To find [the] defendant guilty of [aggravated] assault, do we have to 
believe he was the shooter?  In other words, [aggravated] assault charge encompasses the 




JA184–85.  Because the trial court instructed the jury that there was no question of fact 
regarding whether Tapper suffered serious bodily injury, the jury only had to consider 
whether the evidence was sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Tapper 
caused Roberts’s serious bodily injury and (2) that Tapper caused that injury with the 
requisite mens rea.   
The Commonwealth argues that the “jury could have rationally concluded that 
Tapper shot the victim but lacked the requisite mental state.”  Appellee’s Br. 22.  In 
support of this argument, the Commonwealth points to a potential self-defense argument 
and the trial court’s confusing instructions regarding the mens rea requirements.  These 
arguments are unconvincing because it was the Commonwealth that introduced the size 
disparity between Tapper and Roberts and it did not do so to support a potential self-
defense defense for Tapper.   
Moreover, there is a difference between the introduction of facts that “raised the 
possibility of self-defense,” Appellee’s Br. 22, and the defense actually disputing the 
issue.  Under Ashe, the Court considers the latter, not the former.  See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 
444 n.9.  The trial court’s muddled instructions regarding the required mental state might 
have been relevant to our analysis if Tapper’s counsel had actually put Tapper’s mental 
state in dispute.  Tapper’s counsel, however, did not dispute Tapper’s mental state.  
Disputing Tapper’s mental state would have been wholly inconsistent with the defense 
theory that Tapper was not the shooter.   
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As a result of the trial court’s instruction, the only disputed issue the jury had to 
resolve on the aggravated assault charge was whether the evidence was sufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Tapper caused Roberts’s gunshot wounds; i.e., 
was Tapper the shooter.  The jury’s not guilty verdict on that issue reflects that the jury 
decided that Tapper was not the shooter.3   
C. Tapper’s Second Trial 
To succeed on his double jeopardy claim, Tapper must establish that to secure a 
conviction on the robbery charge at the second trial, the Commonwealth had to prevail on 
the issue of the whether or not he was the shooter.  See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446.  Tapper 
cannot meet this burden.   
The trial court’s jury instructions on the robbery charge were clear and devoid of 
the potential confusion attending the overlapping elements at issue during Tapper’s first 
trial.  The trial court instructed the second jury that for it to find Tapper guilty, the 
Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tapper “intentionally put 
the victim in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; and . . . did this during the course of 
committing a theft.”  JA289.  Thus, unlike the first jury, the second jury was not asked to 
consider whether Tapper shot Roberts.   
 
3 Tapper also contends that when acquitting Tapper on the PIC charge, “the jury 
necessarily decided that . . . Tapper did not possess a gun with the intent to use it to 
commit aggravated assault or robbery.”  Appellant’s Br. 29.  The record as to what the 
jury decided in relation to the PIC charge is less clear than on the aggravated assault 
charge.  The trial court did not narrow the issues for the jury as it did with the aggravated 
assault charge.  Tapper’s defense did not dispute whether Tapper possessed a weapon or 
had the requisite intent to use it to commit aggravated assault or robbery.  Instead, the 
defense disputed whether Tapper was the shooter.   
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Tapper contends that the Commonwealth relied on the same Tapper-was-the-
shooter theory during the second trial and never “once argued that . . . Tapper put . . . 
Roberts in fear of serious bodily injury in any way.”  Appellant’s Br. 30–31.  Per Tapper, 
the issue of whether he was the shooter was the “ultimate issue of fact at both trials,” and 
a retrial on the same theory violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Appellant’s Br. 32.   
Tapper’s argument does not accord with the evidence presented during the second 
trial.  The Commonwealth presented a substantial amount of evidence to support a 
finding that Tapper placed Roberts in fear of immediate serious bodily injury separate 
and apart from the shooting.  This evidence included the time of night; Tapper’s demand 
for money; Tapper’s approaching Roberts from behind, twice; Tapper’s grabbing of the 
back of Roberts’s shirt; and Roberts’s reaction to Tapper—a nearly immediate resort to 
violence—from which the jury could infer that Roberts was in fear of immediate serious 
bodily injury. 
Notwithstanding the Commonwealth opening the second trial with the same 
description it used to open the first trial—a “robbery turned to gun violence”—the issue 
of whether Tapper threatened Roberts with immediate serious bodily injury was not 
“inextricable” from the issue of whether Tapper was the shooter.  JA209; Appellant’s Br. 
32.  In the context of the second trial, where the jury only had to determine whether there 
was sufficient evidence for a robbery conviction, this framing suggests that one of the 
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Commonwealth’s theories may have been that the robbery was completed in the seconds 
prior to the shooting.4   
The evidence presented during the second trial was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for robbery absent evidence of the shooting.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Leatherbury, 473 A.2d 1040, 1042–43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (affirming convictions for 
robbery and assault (which required a threat of “imminent serious bodily injury”) when 
the defendant and another assailant approached an elderly man walking alone at 1:15 
a.m., grabbed him by both arms, and demanded money and his wallet (emphasis added)); 
Commonwealth v. Mays, 375 A.2d 116, 117–18. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (affirming a 
robbery conviction where the complainant’s long-time acquaintance followed her into a 
stairwell, stuck an unidentified object into her side, and declared that it was a “stickup”). 
In sum, the ultimate issue decided by the first jury—that Tapper was not the 
shooter—was not essential to Tapper’s conviction for robbery during the second trial.  As 
a result, Tapper’s second trial was not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.5  See 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446; see also Currier, 138 S. Ct. at 2150. 
 
4 Tapper highlights the fact that during closing arguments, the Commonwealth argued 
that “[r]obbery is simply in the course of committing a theft inflicting serious bodily 
injury on another person.  It encompasses a shooting.”  JA279.  This language is 
insufficient to convince us that the second jury necessarily considered whether Tapper 
was the shooter in light of the Commonwealth also arguing that the robbery and shooting 
were separate.  Also, the jury instructions made clear that one of the relevant questions 
was whether Tapper put Roberts in fear of serious bodily injury, not whether Tapper 
caused serious bodily injury. 
5 On reply, Tapper argues that the Commonwealth was barred from introducing evidence 
and advancing arguments regarding Tapper being the shooter.  Despite raising this 
argument before the District Court, Tapper did not raise this argument in his opening 
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* * * 
The Superior Court did not consider the entire record and focused on the 
differences between the elements of aggravated assault and robbery.  This approach 
ignored the requirements of Ashe and was an incorrect application of federal law.  See 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (requiring courts to “examine the record of a prior proceeding, 
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter”).  
Nevertheless, the Superior Court’s application of federal law was not unreasonable 
because the same outcome, a denial of the relief Tapper seeks, is justified under Ashe.  
See Werts, 228 F.3d at 197.  
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order.   
 
brief before this Court.  This argument, accordingly, is forfeited.  See In re Wettach, 811 
F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that arguments not developed in an appellant’s 
opening brief are forfeited).   
